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stantive right has been violated. In the present case the sale of
the land for less than two-thirds the appraised price is an informality, unless considering all the circumstances a so-called
just price is not obtained. To complicate this matter, the case
was remanded to determine if the estate was solvent. If the
estate was insolvent, no prejudice occurred to the plaintiff, and
the basic element of an absolute nullity disappears. This information could not be gleaned from the public records. Therefore
the purchaser of property that shows a defect of title resulting
from a judicial sale takes a title which is clouded until a judge
decides such questions as just price and prejudice of substantive rights.
The rule does, however, cast some light on the question
whether ten- or thirty-year prescription should apply. The cases
on this point are inconsistent, 21 but it is a logical corollary to
the instant case that when article 3543 is inoperative because of
the adjudicatee's bad faith or a radical error or absolute nullity
on the face of the records, thirty-year prescription should be the
proper rule to apply. In Bordelon, since two-thirds the appraised
value was not received and the inadequacy of the price was on
the face of the records, the plaintiff would not lose his right of
action for over fifty-one years. 22 On the other hand, if from
an examination of the records there appears only a relative nullity or informality, and it is subsequently discovered that a substantive right had been prejudiced, the purchaser who bought on
the faith of the public records has a just title for purposes of
ten-year prescription. Such a rule would give some standard
to a good-faith third purchaser to estimate his right and to
calculate his risks of loss.
Benjamin F. Day
MINERAL RIGHTS - TITLE CONTROVERSIES WITH THE STATE AND
ITS AGENCIES - SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

The common-law maxim -

the King can do no wrong -

has

been transposed in most states, including Louisiana, into a simi21. Pearlstine v. Mattes, 223 La. 1032, 67 So. 2d 582 (1953) ; Hicks v. Hughes,
223 La. 290, 65 So. 2d 603 (1953). But cf. Arceneaux v. Cormier, 175 La. 941,
144 So. 722 (1932).
22. Prescription would have been suspended by the minority of the posthumous
child for more than twenty-one years. Only after this could the running of the
thirty-year prescription begin to accrue. Tillery v. Fuller, 190 La. 586, 182 So.

683 (1938).
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lar doctrine- the state can do no wrong. This sovereign immunity makes it difficult for a private landowner to prevent encroachment by mineral lessees of the state when the latter claims
ownership adversely. Prior to creation of the State Mineral
Board, Louisiana as sovereign sued in its own name in matters
pertaining to mineral interests.' The legislature then established the Mineral Board to supervise the state's mineral activities, 2 and vested it with the usual powers incident to corporations, including the right to sue and be sued.8 Title to the lands
and mineral rights remained in the state. 4 Having given the
Mineral Board power to sue and be sued, the legislature waived
the state's immunity in certain disputes over mineral rights, 5
affording the landowner some relief when the state claims title
adversely. However, the extent of this relief depends on the
action instituted by the landowner: whether adjudication of
ownership is necessary or mere possession is at stake." The
petitory action,7 possessory action,8 and action to remove cloud
from title are available to determine ownership or possession
1. See State v. Texas Co., 205 La. 417, 425, 17 So. 2d 569 572 (1944):
"Unquestionably before the passage of Act 93 of 1936 there existed in the state
the right to sue or be sued in its own name on matters pertaining to its
mineral interests; all suits of that nature then were in the name of the state
proper, whether as plaintiff or defendant."
2. LA. R.S. 30:129 (1950).
3. Id. 30:121.
4. See Walmsley v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 244 La. 513, 526, 153
So. 2d 375, 379 (1963) ; Daigle v. Pan American Prod. Co., 236 La. 578, 587,
108 So. 2d 516, 519 (1958) ; State v. Texas Co., 205 La. 417, 426, 17 So. 2d 569,
572 (1944); St. Mary Parish Land Co. v. State Mineral Board, 167 So. 2d 509,
516 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
5. LA. R.S. 30:121 (1950).
6. See Walmsley v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 244 La. 513, 519, 153
So. 2d 375, 376 (1963) : "The State is an indispensable party if this is a petitory
action as defendant contends. The State is not an indispensable party if this
is an action to remove a cloud from title as plaintiffs contend." Daigle v. Pan
American Prod. Co., 236 La. 578, 588, 108 So. 2d 516, 519 (1958) : "As observed
above, a suit against the mineral board seeking the cancellation of a mineral
lease granted by the board is not an action against the state without its consent . . . . [B]ut this principle does not apply to an action wherein .the sole

purpose is the determination of title." See also St. Mary Parish Land Co. v.
State Mineral Board, 167 So. 2d 509, 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) : "In the
case of Louisiana Navigation Co., Ltd., v. Oyster Commission . . . our Supreme
Court made an appropriate observation: '[T]he contention that this action
[possessory action] indirectly involves the title to lands of the State which cannot be sued without its consent is obviously untenable. Possessory actions can
be maintained against agencies of the State. There are other defenses than
setting up titles to possessory actions.' "
7. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3651 (1960).
8. Id. art. 3655.
9. See Daigle v. Pan American Prod. Co., 236 La. 578, 585, 586, 108 So. 2d
516, 518 (1958) : "The action to quiet title is clearly one to remove a cloud
therefrom. It is neither petitory nor possessory, nor is it one in jacti-ation
nor one to try title . . . .

Having no codal or statutory background, it

innovation of our jurisprudence."

is an

See also Note, 33 TUL. L. REv. 895 (1959).
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of land. This Note examines these actions and the relief afforded
when a private landowner seeks adjudication of ownership to
mineral lands the state claims adversely.
Petitory Action.1o The petitory action seeks recognition of
ownership. It is brought by one not in possession of immovable
property or a real right against another who is in possession
or who claims ownership adversely." Under the Louisiana Constitution, consent of the legislature is required to sue the state
if ownership of real rights is at issue. 12 Therefore a petitory

action against the Mineral Board, if decided in favor of the private landowner, would not bind the state because the Board does
not have title13 and the very nature of this action is adjudication
of ownership. When the plaintiff is not in possession and seeks
adjudication of ownership in a petitory action, he is without
relief if the state does not waive immunity.
Possessory Action.' 4 In the possessory action, the possessor

of immovable property seeks to be maintained in or restored to
possession if he has been disturbed or evicted. 1 5 To succeed, the
plaintiff must allege and prove: possession of the immovable

at the time of disturbance; uninterrupted or quiet possession
for a year prior thereto; disturbance in law or fact ;1 and institution of suit within one year after disturbance. 7 While ownership is not at issue, evidence of ownership is admissible to prove
10. Under the new Code of Civil Procedure, two actions were marged into today's broader petitory action: the old petitory action of La. Code of Practice art.
43 (1870) and the action to establish title which was the former LA. R. S. 13:5062
(1950).
11. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3651 (1960).
12. LA. CONST. art. III, § 35. See also Walmsley v. Pan American Petroleum
Co., 244 La. 513, 153 So. 2d 375 (1963); Daigle v. Pan American Prod. Co.,
236 La. 578, 108 So. 2d 516 (1958); Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions,
229 La. 1, 85 So. 2d 10 (1956) ; Texas Co. v. State Mineral Board, 216 La. 742,
44 So. 2d 841 (1949); Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins, 209 La. 826, 25 So. 2d
606 (1946) ; O'Brien v. State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 (1945) ;
Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So. 2d 917 (1945); Realty Operators v. State
Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 (1942)
State v. Liberty Oil Co.,
154 La. 267, 97 So. 438 (1923)
State ex rel. Cunningham v. Lazarus, 40 La.
Ann. 856, 5 So. 289 (1888).
13. See Daigle v. Pan American Prod. Co., 236 La. 578, 588, 108 So. 2d 516,
519 (1958) : "As pointed out above, the mineral board does not have title to
land or mineral rights, title thereto remaining in the state."
14. Under the new Code of Civil Procedure, two actions were merged into
today's possessory action: the old possessory action of La. Code of Practice art. 49
(1870) and the jactitory action which is discussed in Comment, 12 TUL. L. REV.
254 (1938).
15. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3655 (1960).
16. Id. art. 3659.
17. Id. art. 3658.
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the nature and extent of possession,," and a successful plaintiff
may have the court order defendant to assert whatever title he
has or forever be precluded from doing so. 19
The possessory action, unlike the petitory action, may be
maintained against the Mineral Board as it has juridical capacity to sue and be sued2 ° and ownership is not at issue. The relief afforded is limited, however, as the Board has no title 21 and
an order to assert title is useless. An order for the state to assert title is futile since this would be tantamount to a petitory
action against the sovereign without its consent. Further, validity of such a decree is doubtful since the state is not a party
to the action. This distinction between a suit against the state
and one against its agent has been recognized. In two cases, lessees of the Mineral Board called the Board in warranty to maintain their peaceable possession. 22 The state and the Board argued that since the Board was agent for the state, it could not
be called in warranty, and the state as sovereign could be sued
only with its consent. Both exceptions were overruled, the court
reasoning that the Board, by statute, was a corporate body
which could sue and be sued, and that the state, in allowing the
Board to execute leases, was not acting in its capacity as sovereign but in a proprietary or quasi-private manner for the
advantage of the citizens of the state; having accepted benefits
under the leases, the state could not escape its obligations under
them, one of which is warranty. To hold the lessees bound under
the contracts yet deny them enforceable rights would allow the
state to escape its just obligation. More recently in Daigle v.
Pan American Prod. Co.,2 3 the Supreme Court stated in dictum
that although the Mineral Board was agent of the state for developing its land for mineral purposes, the state had not given
the Board title to lands or mineral rights, and a suit against the
Board for cancellation of a mineral lease was not a suit against
the state. 24 These cases seem to recognize that plaintiff would
be in a difficult situation if no relief whatever were available
against the state or the Mineral Board. However, more recent
18. Id. art. 3661.
19. Id. art. 3662.
20. LA. R.S. 30:121 (1950).
21. See note 13 supra.
22. Texas Co. v. State Mineral Board, 216 La. 742, 44 So. 2d 841 (1949)
Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins, 209 La. 826, 25 So. 2d 606 (1946).
23. 236 La. 578, 108 So. 2d 516 (1958).
24. Id. at 587, 108 So. 2d at 519.
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decisions illustrate the inadequacy that still exists owing to state
immunity.
In St. Mary ParishLand Co. v. State Mineral Board,25 plaintiff instituted a possessory action against the Mineral Board
and its lessee, seeking recognition of plaintiff's possession of
certain lands, and asking that defendant be required to institute a petitory action within sixty days.2 6 Plaintiff introduced
patents from the state as evidence of title to the lands and water
bottoms in question. The Mineral Board contended that both it
and the state must consent to the possessor-y-action-an-d-that-tle
state was an indispensable party.27 In disposing of the Board's
claim that title to the water bottoms was in the state owing to
their navigability in 1812,28 the court said that the state might
have lost title by the divesting patent and by failure to claim
title within six years.2 9 Finding that plaintiff had shown its
possession to the lands, the court gave proper recognition to the
rule that a possessor is presumed to possess according to title
and the full extent of his lands.30 The contention that the state
must be joined as an indispensable party to a possessory action
against the Mineral Board was rejected in accordance with prior
jurisprudence. 3 1 The court recognized that if this action were
not available, property owners might have no remedy, and the
state could record mineral leases on property at will.8 2 The court
ordered the Mineral Board to assert the state's claim to ownership within sixty days, but the Supreme Court recognized, in
refusing writs, that the Board could not bind the state to assert
title, because the state could not be so compelled without its
25. 167 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writs refused, 246 La. 908, 168
So 2d 821 (1964).
26. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3652 (1960).
27. 167 So. 2d 509, 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
28. See id. at 514, wherein it is explained that the state was claiming title
on the basis of its sovereignty when admitted to the Union in 1812.
29. La. Acts 1912, No. 62, now LA. R.S. 9:5661 (1950).
30. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3498, 3437 (1870).
31. O'Brien v. State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So. 2d 470 (1945)
Realty Operators v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So. 2d 198 (1942).
32. 167 So. 2d 509, 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) : "Clearly plaintiff's action
does not involve the title to the property .... If the State claims title to the
property it should be compelled to assert it and these proceedings are the proper
vehicle therefor. And if it does not claim title, then it_slould not grant mineral
leases on it. After all, what is a-property ownr to do when the State records
mineral leases on Property he possesses as owner?
"If this action is not available to a plaintiff in such cases, it is uncertain
that property owners have any remedy and the State may record mineral leases
on any property within its boundaries at its will, while the owners have to
remain helpless."
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consent. 33 Even though the mineral lease from the state was
cancelled and plaintiff's possession maintained, the issue of ownership remained undetermined. It is submitted that determination of ownership is a right which should not be denied a landowner with an obviously meritorious claim, and this case illustrates that the possessory action is an empty remedy when the
state claims ownership adversely. In an attempt to cure this
inadequacy, resort to a third action has taken place with unfortunate results which break the bounds of Louisiana's procedural system of real actions.
Action to Remove Cloud from Title.34 This action has no
statutory base. After early decisions casting doubt on its existence, it was recognized in 1924 by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Exchange National Bank v. Head.33 The action may be invoked if a recorded instrument interferes with enjoyment of
one's ownership. At common law, possession by the plaintiff
is necessary, but in some states this rule has been changed by
statute.36 In Louisiana both parties can be out of possession,
and title can be tried ;37 thus the action assumes aspects of the
action to try title and the petitory action, but falls into neither
category.3 8 Prior to adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure,
it was uncertain whether this was a fifth real action, and legislation was suggested to clarify the situation.3 9 The new Code
unfortunately left this question unanswered, and the result has
been that in the past two years both state and federal courts have
made use of the action to achieve "justice" where a private landowner was faced with state immunity in a dispute over mineral
33. St. Mary Parish Land Co. v. State Mineral Board, 246 La. 908, 168 So. 2d

821 (1964).
34. For jurisprudential and historical background of this action see JOHNSON,
REAL ACTIONS 67 (1961) ; Note, 33 TUL. L. REV. 895 (1959).
35. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Head, 155 La. 309, 314, 99 So. 272, 273-74 (1924).

LOUISIANA

In speaking of the action to remove a cloud from title the court stated: "The
relief sought is, not that the defendants be ordered to disclaim title or to make
good the asserted title ...
"But even where the plaintiff, claiming ownership, is not in actual possession
of the property, he may yet have his action against a party out of possession
for the cancellation of a recorded deed and to remove a cloud on his title."
36. See Note, 33 TUL. L. REV. 895 (1959).
37. See Daigle v. Pan American Prod. Co., 236 La. 578, 108 So. 2d 516
1958); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Head, 155 La. 309, 314, 99 So. 272, 273-74
(1925). See also Note, 33 TUL. L. REV. 895 (1959).
38. See Note, 33 TUL.

.A1EV. 895, 896

(1959).

39. Zengel, The Real Actions-A Study in Code Revision, 29 TUL. L. REv.
617, 634 n.59_1955) ; Note, 33 TUr. L. REV. 895 (1959). The four real actions
existing at-the time were the old petitory and possessory actions as well as the
actijn- to)establish title and the jactitory action.
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lands. While these decisions may appeal to one's sense of fair
play, they do extreme violence to Louisiana's system of real
40
actions.
This action is available to a plaintiff, either in or out of
possession, against a party not in possession. 41 In Walmsley v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp.42 defendant, the state's lessee,
contended it was in possession of certain lands and claimed that
possession was being maintained by production of oil, gas and
other minerals. Defendant asserted that since plaintiff was
claiming ownership, he must bring a petitory action, as he could
not do unless the state consented. The court was thus confronted
with a plaintiff who could bring neither a possessory nor a petitory action, 43 and if defendant's possession were upheld, prior
jurisprudence would preclude an action to remove a cloud from
title. 44 Thus plaintiff, holding record title to lands, might be
completely without remedy because defendant's claim to possession and ownership was on behalf of the state. This harsh result
was avoided by an extremely technical construction of defendant's allegations, the court reasoning that defendant had not alleged it was in possession and therefore its claim of possession
by production was inadequate. 45 The decision has been soundly
criticized for extending the action to remove cloud from title
to include the case of a defendant in possession, 46 which under
40. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term
-

Mineral Rights, 24 LA. L. REV. 215, 231, 233 (1964).

41. This view was upheld in dictum in Daigle v. Pan American Prod. Co.,
236 La. 578, 585-86, 108 So. 2d 516, 518 (1958): "In an action to remove a
cloud possession is not necessary in either plaintiff or defendant."
42. 244 La. 513, 153 So. 2d 375 (1963).
43. The possessory action was not available to plaintiff because under LA.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3658 (1960)

the possessory action must be insti-

tuted within one year from the time of the disturbance. In this case, defendant
claimed possession for more than one year by the production of oil and gas. The
petitory action was not available because defendant-lessee held a lease granted
by the Mineral Board as agent for the state, and the latter would be immune
to suit as a sovereign.
44. Parish of Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939)
Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Kendall, 161 La. 337, 108 So. 664 (1926); Exchange
Nat'l Bank v. Head, 155 La. 309, 99 So. 272 (1924).
45. Walmsley v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 244 La. 513, 524, 153 So. 2d
375, 378-79 (1963) : "Paragraph IG sets forth a reservation for a claim for production that 'may' have been removed. This means nothing, for it neither alleges
that oil, gas or other minerals were or were not removed. And, as defendants
properly observed, nowhere is it alleged that defendants are in possession by the
use of the word 'possession,' This makes it difficult to construe the petition
to mean plaintiffs intended to allege that defendants were in possession within
the contemplation of Article 3651 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
46. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term
-- Mineral Rights, 24 LA. L. REV. 215, 229 (1964) ; Note, 38 TUL. L. REV. 190
(1963).
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the real actions of the Code of Civil Procedure is governed by
the petitory action. 47 While Walmsley apparently provides additional recourse to plaintiffs in similar situations, the decision
may be easily avoided in subsequent cases if a defendant simply
alleges his possession instead of claiming it. If defendant alleges
and proves possession, the action to rcnove a cloud will apparently not be available, and when the state claims ownership adversely, he will be in the hopeless situation of being unable to
bring any action - petitory, possessory, or one to remove cloud
from title. While the result is an obvious effort to give the
plaintiff a right he justly deserves, unfortunately under Louisiana law such a right does not exist when the state or its agent,
the Mineral Board, proves its possession, raising the presumption of ownership, 48 and the state refuses consent to suit. The
clich6 hard facts make bad law is applicable to Walmsley, 49 and
it has been suggested that the decision probably would not be
reached again except on the identical and peculiarly harsh facts
of that case. 50 Again, unfortunately, this has not been so.
In Stevens v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 51 a recent case
from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, substantial royalties
in escrow were at stake, and could be disbursed only upon determination of ownership of certain land. Plaintiff, confronted by
defendants holding mineral leases from the Mineral Board as
agent for the state, properly pointed out that under Louisiana
law adjudication of ownership could be had only if the state
were a party to a petitory action. 52 Defendants were lessees of
the Mineral Board, and the state was protected by sovereign
immunity. The court reasoned that the petitory action was
not the only action available and that plaintiff should file a
supplemental petition to quiet or to remove a cloud from title
and join the Mineral Board. The court stated that plaintiff
could get a declaration of ownership only by bringing a petitory
action and that the state would be an indispensable party. 53 But
47. See note 46 supra.
48. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3498, 3437 (1870).
49. The lVork of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term
-- Mineral Rights, 24 LA. L. REV. 215, 231 (I964).
50. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term
Civil Procedure, 26 LA. L. REV. 581, 598 (1966).
51. 346 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1965).
52. Id. at 46. Plaintiff contended he was denied prompt adjudication of the
title question because the state and its lessees conspired to keep the question
of ownership from being decided by the state urging sovereign immunity and
the lessees refusing -to call the state in warranty.
53. 346 F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1965).
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the court reasoned that the decree of the district court did not
require a declarationof plaintiff's ownership as condition precedent to distribution of the escrow fund, but only an adjudicaiton
of ownership. Interpreting what it found to be the Louisiana
law concerning the action to quiet or remove a cloud from title,
the court said:
"In Walmsley and Daigle the Louisiana Supreme Court
has made it clear that there can be an adjudication of title
incidental to cancellation of a state mineral lease, whether
54
or not the state is joined." (Emphasis added.)
Thus this decision holds that the real party in interest, the state,
was not necessary where the issue of ownership was being adjudicated adversely to it in an action to remove cloud from title,
a clear violation of the procedural system of this state. 55 This
decision is not supported by the holding of the Daigle case which
must be limited to the facts there presented.5 It is questionable
whether the distinction drawn between adjudicationand declaration of ownership exists.5 7 As in Walmsley, the presumption
of ownership given to a possessor was apparently overlooked. 58
The law was further confused by the implication in Daigle that
ownership is not an issue 59 in a suit to compel the Mineral Board
to cancel leases even though ownership may be determined incidentally to the cancellation.6" To the contrary, the very nature
of the action to quiet title is protection of ownership. Therefore a case cannot be decided without adjudication of plaintiff's
61
claim of ownership.
Summary and Conclusion. Under present law, a private landowner may be without relief in title controversies with the state.
54. Ibid.
55. Actions involving determination of ownership to land are clearly governed
by the petitory action.
56. Daigle v. Pan American Prod. Co., 236 La. 578, 587-88, 108 So. 2d 516,
519 (1958). This case holds that an action against the State Mineral Board
seeking determination of title is impossible without consent of the state to suit.
57. No explanation for this distinction is found in the decision. It is apparently similar tothe construction given to the defendant's pleadings in the Walmsley case, where the court held that defendant had claimed possession instead of
alleging possession. For analysis of this construction see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term -Mineral Rights, 24 LA..L. REV.

215, 232 (1964).
58. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3498, 3437 (1870).
59. Daigle v. Pan American Prod. Co., 236 La. 578, 588, 108 So. 2d 516, 519

(1958).
60. Ibid.
61. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term
-Mineral
Rights, 24 LA. L. REV. 215, 235 (1964).
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The petitory action, adjudicating ownership, is not available unless legislative consent is procured. The possessory action affords some relief if brought against the Mineral Board as agent
for the state. However, the plaintiff must satisfy the necessary
legal requirements prior to institution of this action,6 2 and even
if this is done, the St. Mary's case vividly illustrates the limitations of the relief afforded.6 3 While the action to remove cloud
from title has been resorted to with success by private landowners, its-afplication has been extended beyond intended
bounds in the Walmsley and Stevens decisions. This extension
has led to unwarranted encroachment on Louisiana's real actions,
but it reflects concern by the judiciary over inadequacy of remedies in this area.
To clear up some of the confusion, the following suggestions
are submitted. The action to remove cloud from title should be
abolished by legislation. This was suggested both prior to the
Code of Civil Procedure 64 and since its adoption in the wake of
the Walmsley decision. 5 Legislation should be enacted to give
a plaintiff the right to have his controversy with the state adjudicated by the real actions. This, of course, calls for either partial or total abrogation of state immunity. Opponents of such
abrogation contend that the state would be subjected to a flood
of litigation and undue expense. Originally, governmental immunity was based on the theory that governmental functions
were for public benefit and taxes raised should not be used to
defend and pay damage claims when the government was not
acting in a private capacity. 6 In prior Louisiana decisions,
leasing of mineral lands by the state or the Mineral Board has
been characterized as proprietary or quasi-private activity rather
than a governmental function, 6T which negates the argument that
62. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3658 (1960).
63. See St. Mary Parish Land Co. v. State Mineral Board, 246 La. 908, 168
So.2d 821 (1964).
64. See Zengel, The Real Actions -A Study in Code Revision, 29 TUL. L.
REV. 617, 634 n.59 (1955).
65. See The Wlork of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term
- Mineral Rights, 24 LA. L. REV. 215, 235 (1964).
66. Hamill, The Changing Concept of Sovereign Imunity, 13 DEFENSE L.J.
653 (1964).
67. Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins, 209 La. 826, 833, 25 So.2d 606, 608
(1946) : "The argument that because ordinarily the State as a sovereignty can
not be sued in its courts except with its consent is untenable. It overlooks the
fact that while the State possesses legislative, public and governmental power
in 1the exercise of which it is a sovereignty and governs its people, it also possesses proprietary and quasi private power conferred upon it not for the purpose
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a governmental body should not have to stand trial when exercising public functions. Moreover, under such legislation as the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 68 immunity is waived, and other studies
indicate, in the field of torts at least, that there is a trend away
from sovereign immunity. As one writer says:
"To the objection that abrogation of it [sovereign immunity]
would bankrupt many public bodies, the answer is insurance. To the objection that it is more equitable to make the
wronged party bear his own loss than to have the community through its taxpayers bear it, the answer is in modern
society the individual loss is often collectively borne."6 9
A very limited measure of relief is afforded by the Title
Controversy Committee of the Mineral Board. However, this
body has no authority to settle the ownership of lands. Solutions
emanating from the committee take the form of unitization
agreements in which the parties agree to royalty sharing, temporarily solving the important problem of revenue distribution.
But these agreements are terminable at the will of either party,
at which time judicial action may be instituted. If an amicable
settlement is reached, some measure of relief is afforded, but
negotiations with the committee may prove unsuccessful, and
for the private landowner claiming ownership adversely to the
state the problem of securing authorization to sue the sovereign
may be insurmountable.
It is suggested that state immunity from suit in the area of
title controversies be abrogated. Denying record titleholders
their day in court when they have a meritorious claim is reprehensible and foreign to our ideas. Abolition of the action to
remove cloud and abrogation of sovereign immunity would also
bring harmony to the real actions which at present are confused
to say the least.
Robert A. Seale, Jr.
of governing its people but for the private advantage of the inhabitants of the
State itself as a legal per.;onality ....
[Prior cases] held that when the State
executed a mineral lease it was acting in its proprietary or quasi private
capacity."

68. 28 U.S.C. § 26374

(1964).

69. Comnment, Sovereign fImunanity in ('olorado, and the Feasibility of Judicial

Abrogation, 35 COLO. L. RE%. 529, 555 (19063).

